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• Specific Research Question
• Data, Methodology, Analysis & Results
• Implications of Findings
Some Definitions
• What is an exchange rate regime?
– It is the system  a country’s monetary authority uses to 
determine its exchange rate against other currencies 
– Freely Floating System: supply and demand in the foreign 
exchange market determines the price of our currency, the 
USD, against say, the British Pound
– Opposite extreme – Fixed Exchange Rate System: the 
Central Bank determines what the price of your currency 
will be in terms of another currency. E.g. The Hong Kong 
dollar is pegged to the USD.
– Range of arrangements in between
Range of Exchange Rate Regimes 
• Source: Policonomics
Polity Regimes
• The system under which the governing 
authority or institution of an independent 
country is established and operates
• Range: fully institutionalized autocracies to 
fully institutionalized democracies with mixed 
or incoherent authority regimes in between 
(anocracies)
Sub-Saharan Africa (Source: Researchgate)
• Source: Researchgate
Research Issue
• Traditionally, in advanced economies, economic 
considerations drive the exchange rate regime choice
• Balance of power between economic agents who stand 
to gain from flexible exchange rates versus agents with 
a strong preference for stability of exchange rates
• However, in frontier and transition economies, political 
factors play a significant role in the exchange rate 
regime choice determination
• This project examines the linkages between varying 
degrees of democratization and exchange rate regimes 
in sub-Saharan Africa
• Why Africa? Why sub-Saharan Africa?
The African Experience
• 18 of the 20 slowest growing countries in the world 
during 1960-2000 happen  to be in Africa
• 38  countries  in Africa recorded  a mean growth  rate of 
0.6 percent  per year over the same period (Barro & 
Sala-i-Martin, 2004)
• Consistent problems with obsolete infrastructure, 
corruption, widespread poverty and malnutrition, 
exacerbated with frequent epidemics of diseases such as 
malaria, Ebola
• Political leaders have an incentive to stay in office for a 
protracted period
• Selects economic policies that enhance (re)electability 
and minimizes likelihood of a military takeover
Factors Behind African Growth Puzzle
• Ethno-linguistic fractionalization (Barr  & Oduro, 2002, Easterly  & 
Levine,  1997)
• Corruption (Vicente,  2010)
• Environmental  factors  such  as natural  resources (Sachs  & 
Warner,  2001)
• History of slavery (Nunn, 2008)
– Using data   from  shipping  records, finds  negative  relationship 
between the number  of slaves exported  from each country  and 
current  economic   performance
• Link between precolonial  statehood and current  regional African  
development (Michalopoulos and   Papaioannou, 2015)
• Tse Tse Fly-suitable  areas of Africa were less likely to be politically 
centralized  historically in the precolonial  era (Aslan, 2015)
• Bottomline: heterogeneity of today’s African growth experience has 
multiple sources
Broader Context and Motivation
• Economic growth: objective for both advanced  
countries (stable growth rate) and emerging 
countries (high growth rate)
• Issue of concern for domestic governments, 
global institutions such as World Bank, IMF, 
BIS, OECD, etc., academics, private investor 
groups, public-private partnerships, policy-
makers
Context & Motivation (contd.)
• Complex set of determinants of economic growth 
identified by the literature across disciplines of 
economics and finance, development economics, 
political science and law, history, entrepreneurship
• From economics and finance:
– real income, savings rate, financial intermediary  
development: Demirguc-Kunt &  Levine,  (1996),  Levine  &  
Zervos,  (1998) 
– Trade openness, exchange rate regimes, foreign direct 
investment: Bortolotti & Milella, (2006)
– stock market performance,  liquidity, size, turnover:  Ben 
Naceur,  Ghazouani, & Omran, (2007)
Context & Motivation (contd.)
• Inter-disciplinary literature suggests a wide range of 
factors: 
– democracy: Boubakri & Hamza,  (2007), Biswas and Ofori, 
(2015) 
– inequality, legal environment, sustained program of  
privatization: Roe and Siegel, (2011), 
– political risk  (corruption, assurance of property rights): Vicente,  
(2010), Sachs  & Warner,  (2001), Michalopoulos and   
Papaioannou (2015),
– environmental factors (natural resources), colonial legacies 
(slave exports): Nunn   (2008)
– legal origins, ethno-linguistic fractionalization: Yang, (2011), Barr  
& Oduro, (2002), Easterly  & Levine,  (1997) 
– proximity to the equator (Tsetse fly): Aslan  (2015)
Narrower Context
• Exchange Rate Regime choice has also emerged 
as one of the influencers of economic growth  
– though not unequivocally  (Jensen, 2003)
– direction of causality could also be reversed
• So, this study focuses on one narrow aspect of 
this bigger issue: the nature of the influence of 
democratization on exchange rate regime choice
• Ultimate objective of discipline: identify drivers of 
economic growth in poorest nations
Related Literature
• Significant differences between drivers of the 
exchange rate regime choice between 
developed and less developed countries or 
LDCs (Roland, 2002, Markiewicz, 2006, 
Berdiev, Kim and Chang, 2012)
• Advanced economies’ primary considerations: 
unemployment, inflation, output growth 
• LDCs and new democracies: Electoral 
considerations dominate
Related Literature (contd.)
• Electoral democracy brings  with  it  a  minimum   
legal  infrastructure  protecting   property   and 
investor  rights  and  contract   enforcements
• Political  system  under  a democracy introduces
– a system of checks and balances (Siegel  et al, 2004)
– a certain  openness  and  competitiveness   (Haber   et  
al.,  2007) and
– constrains   government   ownership   of  financial  
institutions, including banks (La Porta  et al., 1998, 
1999)
Related Literature (contd.)
• However, there could be some inherent 
inhibiting factors, especially with nascent 
democracies
– uncertainty about the political state
– weak economic environment
– inadequate financial infrastructure
– Inequality - benefits of democratization accruing 
only to a few segments of society while leaving 
ethnic minorities unaffected
Democracy and Exchange Rate Regime 
Choice: The Trade-offs
• Fixed Exchange Rates – domestic currency pegged to a more 
disciplined foreign currency
– Pros
• Exchange rate stability
• Lower, stable inflation
• Commitment to peg implies credibility of leadership
– Cons
• Government loses monetary policy authority
– Unable to use monetary policy tools such as interest rate changes to 
combat recession or unemployment
Democracy and Exchange Rate Regime 
Choice: The Trade-offs (contd.)
• Floating Exchange Rates – FX markets determine exchange 
rate
– Pro
• Monetary policy autonomy
– Government has leeway to deal with macroeconomic issues
– Cons
• Exchange rate volatility
• Possibility of high inflation
• Uncertainty and instability deters foreign investment
• In the end – an empirical issue
Hypothesis Development
• We test the following relationship:
The higher the degree of democracy, the greater the 
likelihood of adopting a pegged exchange rate 
regime
• We test three specific components of the 
electoral process
– Openness of a country’s executive recruitment
– Electoral competition
– Separation of power in country’s political 
economy 
Data and Methodology
• Screen: 
– Data availability
• Final sample: 49 countries; 2000 to 2016
• Data sources: 
– World Development Indicators (2018) 
– Polity IV
– Database of Political Institutions
Data & Methodology (contd).
• Model: 
• 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑍𝑖𝑡 +𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑡 +𝑢𝑖𝑡
– where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 denotes the exchange rate regime of 
country i at time t
– the vector Z is our key independent variable 
representing the democracy index for country i at 
time t
– X is a battery of control variables
• We use Ordered Logit Regression method
Model Specifications
• 3 key components of the electoral process 
examined – sub-categories in Polity IV: 
– Openness of a country’s executive recruitment 
process (EXECRECRUIT)
• Closed = situation where leader of nation is a monarch 
or chosen via hereditary succession
• Open = every politically active member of the 
population can contest for the highest office
Model Specifications (contd.)
• Political competition (EXECCOMP)
– Possibility of 2 or more candidates or parties 
contesting for the highest office
• 1 = little to no competition in the electoral process
• 3 = very competitive process
• Constraints on chief executive (EXECCONST)
– Separation of powers in a country’s political 
system
• 1 = little or no constraints
• 7 = constraints on the chief executive; separation of 
power
Findings and Implications
• Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries with 
higher scores of democratization have a 
greater likelihood of pegging their currency 
(Table III in Appendix)
– Lower inflation is perceived as key to (re)electability
• SSA countries with greater electoral openness 
are more likely to peg their currencies
– Closed electoral system African leaders prefer floating 
their currencies – gives them monetary autonomy to print 
money to enhance (re)electability (Table IV in Appendix)
Findings and Implications (contd.)
• SSA countries with greater electoral competition have a 
greater preference for pegging their currency
– Curbing inflation and establishing their credibility in doing so for 
(re) electability is achieved more easily with a fixed exchange 
rate (Table V in Appendix)
• SSA countries with greater separation of powers (more 
constraints on the chief executive) tend to prefer a 
pegged currency
– Central banks in countries with greater separation of power are 
more independent so leaders do not derive any benefit from 
floating their currencies (Table VI in Appendix)
• SSA countries with military (authoritarian) leaders have 
no relationship with the exchange rate regime choice 
– Military ruler has no re-election concerns; actions are 
independent of exchange rate regime choice (Table VII)
Summary and Conclusions
• Using ordered logit regression analysis on 49 sub-Saharan 
African countries during the period 2000 to 2016, we examine 
the role of political factors in influencing the choice of the 
exchange rate regime
• We find supporting evidence that as the degree of 
democratization increases, there is a stronger preference for 
fixed exchange rates
• Next steps: 
– Distinguish between de jure and de facto exchange rate regimes
– Test for Threshold effect – minimum threshold level of trade with 
single trading partner (former colonial power or powerful neighbor) 
dominate political considerations 
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